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UNITED STATES v. KASMIR: TAXPAYER'S PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-ACCOUNTANT'S





Claims to the self-incrimination privilege in tax fraud investiga-
tions have generated much litigation. Most of the documentary evi-
dence that the government would use in prosecuting these charges
comes from the taxpayer's own books and records, or those of his ac-
countant, usually in the possession of either the accountant, the tax-
payer, or his attorney. Therefore, in airing the government's motion
to enforce production of the documents, courts must carefully weigh
the government's power to collect revenues against the individual's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. With two such impor-
tant interests being litigated, the resolution of the conflict has far-reach-
ing significance.
The opposing forces of the taxpayer and the government have
been tested in a large variety of factual situations and the results have
usually turned on subtle distinctions. In dealing with this problem, the
federal district and appeals courts have failed to formulate a consistent
and workable rule, and often they have confounded more than clarified
the analysis. Amid all this confusion the Supreme Court did not speak
until its 1973 opinion in Couch v. United States,1 and then directly only
to a very limited set of circumstances.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit had an opportunity to apply the Court's
newly announced rule in two cases. The facts of United States v. Kas-
mir,2 its latest decision, appear below.
1. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
2. 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 824 (1975). Editor's
1
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A taxpayer was visited by special agents of the Internal Revenue
Service who informed him that he was under investigation and gave
him Miranda warnings. During their visit, the agents asked to see his
personal books and records which he turned over to them. But upon
calling his accountant, who advised him not to show his records, the
taxpayer immediately withdrew them from the agents' custody. The
next morning, the accountant delivered various documents he had in
his possession, pertaining to the taxpayer's prior taxable years, to the
taxpayer. Within minutes of receiving the documents, the taxpayer
turned them over to Kasmir, his attorney. The following day summons-
es were served on the accountant and Kasmir, ordering the attorney
to give up the documents and the accountant to give testimony concern-
ing them.3 When they declined to comply, the government sought en-
forcement. 4  The district court granted the government's motions, but
stayed its order pending an appeal by the taxpayer. 5 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The taxpayer, after taking pos-
session of the records from his accountant and delivering them to his
attorney prior to service of summons, was permitted to assert the fifth
amendment privilege as to such records; furthermore, the taxpayer's
attorney was held to have standing to invoke the privilege for the tax-
payer. As against the accountant, however, the subpoena to testify was
held to be enforceable. 6
Note: Since this article was written, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to United
States v. Kasmir and the conflicting Third Circuit case of United States v. Fisher, 500
F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), discussed in note 25 infra. The Fisher opinion by the Third
Circuit actually came prior in time, but was not reported until after Kasmir; hence, nei-
ther court had the benefit of the other's opinion.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7602 provides: "For the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return. . . the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-(1) To ex-
amine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant to such inquiry
." The government sought retained copies of the taxpayer's income tax returns,
copies of reports and other correspondence between the accountant and the taxpayer, and
the accountant's work papers pertaining to certain taxable years of the taxpayer. None
of the documents examined by the agents on their initial visit were summoned.
4. Id. § 7604(a) and (b) provide in pertinent part:
(a) ...If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to
appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, the
United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction ...to compel such at-
tendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data.
(b) ...Whenever any person summoned under section ...7602 neg-
lects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records,
or other data . .. the Secretary . . .may apply to the judge of the district
court. ... It shall be the duty of the judge.. . to hear the application...
and upon such hearing . . to make such order as he shall deem proper...
to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish such
person for his default or disobedience.
5. United States v. Kasmir, No. CA 3-6973D (N.D. Tex., Mar. 3, 1973).
6. The court quickly disposed of the accountant's claims on the basis of Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). "[N]o confidential accountant-client privilege ex-
2
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The Kasmir case concerned primarily two issues:
(1) [Whether] the taxpayer's attorney has standing
to raise the taxpayer's constitutional right to be free from
self-incrimination, [and]
(2) [Whether] enforcement of the summons for the
production of records violates the taxpayer's Self-Incrimina-
tion Privilege .... I
The court analyzed these questions in reverse order, reasoning
that without a valid claim to the privilege there would be no need to
consider the issue of standing to assert it.
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
TO THE TAXPAYER
In arriving at its decision, the Kasmir court attempted to distin-
guish an earlier, factually similar, Fifth Circuit case, United States v.
White,8 which had held for the government on the issue of the avail-
ability of the self-incrimination privilege regarding documents in an at-
torney's possession. In disposing of this question, both opinions relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's language in Couch, but the decisions
differed in their application of Couch.
Couch formulated the basic test for a valid claim to the privilege
in cases of this kind:' "[N]o Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where. . . there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and
no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the ac-
cused."'10
In arriving at this rule Couch relied on the historical background
of the privilege. Beginning with the proposition that compelled docu-
ments fall within the orbit of fifth amendment protection,11 it pro-
ceeded to examine the policies and purposes behind the privilege:
[Ojur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
ists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases
... ." Id. at 335.
7. United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 1974). There was a third
issue regarding alleged material misrepresentations made by the agents which was never
reached by the court and is not discussed herein.
8. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), affd en banc, 487 F.2d 1335. For factual dif-
ferences between Kasmir and White see text accompanying note 59 infra.
9. Couch concerned documents in the possession of an independent accountant
which were owned by the taxpayer.
10. 409 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added).
11. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1885); 8 WioMoRE, EvmnNcE § 2264,
at 379 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WiMoRE].
[Vol. 10: 646
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our preference for an accusatorial rather than inquisitional
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-indi-
vidual balance by requiring the government... in its con-
test with the individual to shoulder the entire load,' . . . our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life? .... 1-
The Court transformed these concepts into a workable rule
by dividing its discussions into two parts. First, the fifth amendment,
considered independently, is an expression of the principle that
"[n]o person . . . shall be compelled . . . to be a witness against
himself . ... "13 Since incriminating testimony which is either volun-
tarily elicited 4 or which is obtained from someone other than the sus-
pect15 does not violate the policies behind the privilege, it follows that
only "compulsion directed against the person of the accused" is prohib-
ited. 10
In the case of documents, it is possession, not ownership, which
marks the bounds of the privilege for, as the Court stated:
[Possession bears the closest relationship to the personal com-
pulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. To tie the privi-
lege against self-incrimination to a concept of ownership
would be to draw a meaningless line.1
Therefore, the first element of the Couch test requires that the tax-
payer have a possessory interest in the documents to successfully assert
a fifth amendment claim.' 8
Secondly, there is an area of fourth and fifth amendment overlap1"
and it is from this that the other aspect of the Couch test derives.20
12. 409 U.S. at 328, quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964) (citations omitted).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. In the case of documents an individual is compelled
to testify against himself when he returns a summons because he "produces, identifies,
and verifies" that the incriminating records are the ones named in the court order.
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1967); McCoRMICc, LAW OF EvI-
DENCE § 126, at 268 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; WIoMoRE § 2264,
at 380.
14. 409 U.S. at 328.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 336.
17. Id. at 331.
18. Although the possession need not be actual; see text accompanying note 50
infra.
19. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-35 (1885). Contra, WGMoRE §
2264, at 381-84.
20. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
19751
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Where they "run almost into each other .... ,21 they "delineate a
'sphere of privacy' which must be protected against governmental in-
trusion."22  Hence, only documents with respect to which the tax-
payer has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" can be the proper sub-
ject of a claim to this protection.23
The majority in Couch and dissenting Justices Douglas and Marsh-
all could not agree exactly where the lines should be drawn, but each
of their opinions leaves the impression that either a violation of the fifth
amendment alone, or an infringement of fourth and fifth amendment
rights in conjunction with one another would be a sufficient basis for
denying enforcement of a court order to produce documents.24
Couch's rejection of ownership as the test for personal compulsion
marks a departure from the rule formerly applied by some federal
courts which made ownership a chief requirement for the availability
of the privilege.25  This prior line of authority can be traced to the lan-
guage of United States v. White26 which stated, by way of dictum, that
"the papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private
property of the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his posses-
sion in a purely personal capacity. '27
21. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
22. 409 U.S. at 339-40 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
23. Id. at 336.
24. The Court handled the two issues separately and there is no suggestion that both
must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer before his claim can prevail. Furthermore,
they depend on separate grounds, one on the personal compulsion abhorred by the fifth
amendment, and the other on the right to privacy mapped out by the fourth and fifth
amendments jointly. Kasmir confused these criteria by making the "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" a test for constructive possession. The White majority never mentioned
"legitimate expectation of privacy" in ruling against the taxpayer; see text accompanying
notes 55-56 infra.
25. United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1021 (1969); Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United States
v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974) (the
facts of Fisher are identical to those of Kasmir, but Fisher held for the government,
see note 2 supra); United States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 456
F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
see United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959). Contra, United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967);
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); In re Grant, 198 F. 708(S.D.N.Y. 1912), affd, 227 U.S. 74 (1913). See generally Garbis & Burke, Filth
Amendment Protection of the Accountant's Workpapers in Tax Fraud Investigations, 47
TAXEs 12, 16-18 (1969); Note, Accountant's Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations:
The Taxpayer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 23 Sw. LJ. 728 (1969); Annot.,
37 A.L.R.3d 1373 (1971).
26. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
27. Id. at 699. This language has also been used to support the proposition that
5
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Application of House28 became the first federal case to apply the
White criterion to a federal tax fraud investigation. The object of the
government's subpoena in House was the work papers of an accountant
used to prepare the taxpayer's tax return. When the taxpayer's
attorney learned of the investigation, he arranged an agreement be-
tween the taxpayer and the accountant whereby ownership in the docu-
ments was transferred from the accountant to the taxpayer. Then the
documents were placed directly in the attorney's custody by the
accountant. Subsequently, a subpoena was issued to the attorney di-
recting him to produce the documents sought by the Internal Revenue
agents. He resisted, asserting his client's self-incrimination privilege
as a defense.
The court found that the taxpayer was in constructive possession
of the documents by virtue of his attorney's possession and that the tax-
payer's possession was "rightful and indefinite."2 9  In holding for the
taxpayer, however, the court regarded these findings unnecessary since,
in any event, ownership of the records was in the taxpayer. 80
Although the language of House emphasizes the possession aspect
of the White test and casts doubt on the importance of ownership to
the availability of the privilege,31 subsequent cases, dealing with similar
factual patterns, have apparently read White and House together as
supporting a requirement of "ownership or rightful, indefinite possess-
ion."' 2  Other courts, while making no express reference to either
White or House, have applied this criterion nevertheless. 8
The use of this test results in confusion in situations where, unlike
House, ownership and possession do not coincide. Since, even before
Couch, ownership alone was not a sufficient basis for claiming the priv-
ilege,34 a number of courts made both ownership and possession nec-
essary and defeated a claim of privilege where they did not coexist."
an attorney has no standing to claim the self-incrimination privilege for the benefit of
his client. See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
28. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
29. Id. at 101.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
34. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S.
7 (1918); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913). "A party is privileged from
producing the evidence [himself] but not from its production." Id. at 458.
35. Note 25 supra. In Kasmir, the government unsuccessfully argued that both pos-
session and ownership were necessary to claim the privilege. 499 F.2d at 447, 450.
19751
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This result was reached in a variety of ways where the taxpayer did
not own the documents, usually by finding that he also did not have
"rightful and indefinite possession" of them.
One theory advanced by courts for this purpose denies that the
taxpayer's possession is "rightful and indefinite" where he, or his at-
torney, takes possession with the owner's consent, but only after discov-
ering that he is under investigation, in an effort to clothe the documents
with fifth amendment protection.8 6
This position was argued by the government in Kasmir,87 but
despite its "superficial persuasiveness" was rejected by the court.
Since "the rights and obligations of the parties [become] fixed when
the summons [is] served .... ,,a8 any attempt by the taxpayer to put
the records beyond the reach of a tax investigation is wholly proper
provided that the transfer occurs before the summons is served.89
The view taken by the Kasmir court on this point comports with
reason. There must be some time at which the "rights and obligations"
of, the taxpayer become known and unalterable. Furthermore, the
availability of fifth amendment protection cannot be made to turn on
the taxpayer's motives, "[flor every sucessful claim of privilege frus-
trates to some extent the government's ability to gather evidence."4
Courts have also negated a finding of "rightful and indefinite pos-
session" by considering the rights of the owner versus those of the
possessor. Since ownership is in someone other than the taxpayer,
that person has a superior right to possession. Hence, if the owner of
the documents requests their return and the taxpayer, or his attorney,
refuses, then his possession is not "rightful" from that moment on-
ward.41 Or, if the records are taken merely so that the taxpayer's at-
36. United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
918 (1972); United States v. Fisher, 352 F. Supp. 731, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Accord,
United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68, 71-72 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1021 (1969) (taxpayer's possession was not "rightful and indefinite" where he took pos-
session from his accountant only after defect was discovered in subpoena served on ac-
countant). Zakutansky is most often cited for the rule that possession is determined
at the time the subpoena is served. See, e.g., United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322,
329 n.9 (1973). This reading of Zakutansky disregards the fact that the subpoena served
on the accountant was procedurally defective.
37. The government characterized the "enterprise by the taxpayer, his accountant,
and his attorney [as] 'a frantic last minute effort to put the requested records beyond
the reach of a legitimate tax investigation' by 'winning a footrace with the agents of
the government.'" 499 F.2d at 450.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 451.
40. Id.
41. Deck v. United States, 339 F.2d 739, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
[Vol. 10:646
7
Yates: United States v. Kasmir: Taxpayer's Privilege against Self-Incrim
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
IRS ACCESS TO ATTORNEY'S FILES
torney may examine them, then the taxpayer's possession is "tempo-
rary", not "indefinite", and the possession is terminated with a request
for their return from the owner.42
Usually, in these cases, the owner of the documents in question
is the accountant 43 and he is indifferent about regaining possession of
them but makes the request in an effort to comply with the court order
which has been served upon him. However, courts which have adop-
ted the foregoing analysis have been unfettered by this consideration.
United States v. Cohen44 took a different perspective. By way of
dictum, the court reasoned that even possession wrongfully acquired or
retained in disregard of the owner's rights should be sufficient to sup-
port the privilege.45 This stand, taken by the Ninth Circuit, has been
criticized by other federal courts,46 but that was prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Couch which cites Cohen with approval.47
The practical effect of Couch should be to shift the emphasis of
inquiry from a question of ownership versus possession to a determina-
tion of the quality of possession. While the Court devoted discussion
primarily to situations of actual possession,4" it expressly disclaimed the
notion that a "per se" rule was being adopted.49 It acknowledged that
U.S. 967 (1965); United States v. Pizzo, 260 F. Supp. 216, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 206 (1942).
42. In Re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961).
43. Often, the government seeks the accountant's work papers, as was the case in
Kasmir. Absent some agreement to the contrary, the ownership of these is usually pre-
sumed to be in the accountant, not the taxpayer. See generally Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d
784 (1963).
44. 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967). The facts of Cohen are substantially the same
as those of Deck and Pizzo. See note 41 supra and corresponding text.
45. Id. at 469. The logic of this view was expressed by Judge Learned Hand in
In re Grant, 198 F. 708, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), affd, 227 U.S. 74 (1913):
[Sluppose that A., knowing that B. has papers which would incriminate him,
gets wrongful possession of them from B., whom they do not incriminate. If
B. is content, and leaves A. in possession, I do not understand that it would
be any answer whatever to A, to say: "You cannot keep these back, because
you came by them wrongfully, or at least you have no right to them now."
All the law considers is whether A. has got possession in fact, and whether
the documents actually will tend to incriminate him. To get them in evidence
the law would have to force him to bring them out of possession which is good
enough against any one but B. Certainly, I can find nothing in the books
which suggests such a distinction, and it contradicts the whole history of the
matter.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 918 (1972).
47. 409 U.S. at 330 n.12.
48. Id. at 330-35.
49. Id. at 336 n.20. But, Justice Brennan apparently felt that there was sufficient
doubt regarding the majority's approach to prompt him to write a concurring opinion
in an effort to clarify the quality of possession necessary. Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., con-
1975]
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the claim of privilege would also be available in clear cases of construc-
tive possession or where "the relinquishment of possession is so tempo-
rary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the ac-
cused substantially intact."50  But the Court declined "to conjecture
broadly on the significance of possession in cases and circumstances not
before [it]."' The reluctance of the Supreme Court to articulate a
standard for constructive possession which is the proper subject of a
fifth amendment claim places the burden of this inquiry squarely on
the lower federal courts.52
The emphasis of the Couch majority on personal compulsion
creates conceptual difficulties.53 To test constructive possession in this
way might lead to conflicting results because it is usually difficult to
identify an element of personal compulsion against the accused when
the taxpayer is not in actual possession.54
Kasmir cleverly sidestepped the issue of constructive possession
by moving directly to the second element of the Couch test. The court
reasoned that where the taxpayer was not the actual possessor, his "legi-
timate expectation of privacy" with regard to the evidence would con-
trol.55
curring). And Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, accused the majority of an-
nouncing a "bright-line" rule. Id. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 336 n.20. The Court gave two illustrations, both involving documents
that had been temporarily stored in office safes. Id. at 333-34 n.16.
52. The Kasmir court noted in passing, "the Supreme Court in [Couch] has now
spoken on the subject before us in a manner that guides our journey far down the road
to judgment, but not to the very end." 499 F.2d at 448.
53. 409 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. The courts cannot even agree that an attorney's possession places his client in
constructive possession of the documents. Compare, e.g., Application of House, 144 F.
Supp. 95, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1956) with, e.g., United States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444, 451
(D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972).
55. The Kasmir court remarked:
Thus the method adopted by the Court [in Couch] focuses the inquiry on twofactors: (1) the party in possession of the evidence and (2) where the actual
possessor is not the taxpayer, the taxpayer's legitimate expectation of privacy
with regard to the evidence. By considering not only the question of physical,
personal compulsion upon the accused, but also any expectation of privacy
which might reasonably attach to the summoned materials, the Court was
weighing the extent to which any of the variety of policies enumerated in
Murphy [note 12 supra] would be furthered by application of the privilege.
499 F.2d 449 (emphasis added).
It is true that if the taxpayer has neither actual nor constructive possession, then
his "legitimate expectation of privacy" is controlling. And even if there is a finding
of constructive possession, his "legitimate expectation of privacy" may provide an alter-
native basis for ruling in his favor. But the two facets of the test should be regarded
as distinct grounds for disposition of a case, in the spirit of the Couch decision; see note
24 supra.
9
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Unlike Kasmir, the majority opinion in White, 6 the earlier deci-
sion by the Fifth Circuit, makes no reference to the words "legitimate
expectation of privacy." White summarily disposed of the constructive
possession issue with a mechanical application. Since the taxpayer had
never been in actual possession, it was not possible for his attorney to
hold the documents constructively for him.57 "In these circumstances
the necessary ingredient of personal compulsion . . . [was] totally lack-
ing . . .. ,8
Facing White as "a formidable wall to scale," Kasmir proceeded
to distinguish it on the basis of the only factual differences between
the cases:
The taxpayers had never been in actual possession of the
papers . ... The attorney had obtained the documents di-
rectly from the accountant without record evidence that he
had done so upon the taxpayers' instructions or that they
were even aware that he had secured them. The parties to
the transfer, [the attorney] and the accountant, had agreed
that [the attorney]-not the taxpayers-could keep the
papers indefinitely, but that they would be returned to the
the accountant upon completion of [the attorney's] work.
Thus, the taxpayers retained no right to immediate posses-
sion . . . Their actions could not be said to have evinced
any legitimate expectation of privacy.59
Whether these differences are regarded as determinative of con-
structive possession, of legitimate expectation of privacy, or of both,
they do not present a satisfactory basis for distinguishing White. First,
the taxpayer's "fleeting" possession in Kasmir cannot be conclusive.
This would be "exalting form over substance."' 0 The availability of
the privilege should not be made to turn on such subtle factual varia-
tions.
Secondly, why should the absence of the taxpayer's instructions or
knowledge respecting the attorney's acquisition of the documents be
important?6' The attorney had obtained them in connection with his
clients' case and this should be sufficient.6" Furthermore, to require
56. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), afI'd en banc, 487 F.2d
1335. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
57. Id. at 763.
58. Id. at 764.
59. 499 F.2d at 450 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 456 (Bell, J., dissenting).
61. The majority opinion in White commented that this was not a factor of "con-
trolling importance." 477 F.2d at 763.
62. See text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
1975]
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a client's participation in the exchange would produce the anomalous
result of giving a taxpayer who was intentionally frustrating the govern-
ment's efforts to obtain the evidence greater protection than the tax-
payer whose attorney unexpectedly had the documents in his possession
at the time the summons was served.63
Finally, giving significance to the fact that there was an agreement
to return the documents to the accountant sounds like a reincarnation
of the "ownership or rightful, indefinite possession" test. 4 The clear
and unmistakable language of Couch should have had the effect of ab-
rogating this rule."; While the Kasmir majority pays lip service to this
vivid intent,"6 it would revive the rule in a different form. °7
Taken together, White and Kasmir determine the availability of
the privilege on no more substantial grounds than the slight factual dif-
ferences between them. Yet Kasmir, aware of the prior inconsistent
ruling in White, was not willing to ignore the probable adverse effect
on the sixth amendment right to counsel merely to follow precedent.' 8
However, in its efforts to distinguish rather than overrule White, the
Kasmir court has generated an atmosphere of confusion which can pro-
duce equally undesirable consequences.
Perhaps an attorney who practices in the Fifth Circuit can safely
rely on these decisions and have his client participate in every transfer
63. The fifth amendment privilege has been characterized as a "fighting clause" re-
quiring a "beligerent claim" to its protection. United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp.
538, 540 (M.D. Pa. 1947). But this should not be taken to mean that the attorney and
his client have to contrive the only situations where it can be successfully asserted. And
the fact that "every successful claim of privilege frustrates to some extent the govern-
ment's ability to gather evidence" (note 40 supra) does not mean that those who go out
of their way to put the documents beyond the government's reach should receive special
rewards.
64. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
65. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
66. The Kasmir court rejected the government's argument that both ownership and
possession were required. 499 F.2d at 450. But the situation in Kasmir involved nei-
ther an agreement to return the documents to their owner nor a demand for their return
from the owner. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
67. The Kasmir majority admits that ownership is a factor to be considered. Id.
at 450 n.2.
68. In discussing this point the court reflected:
If we hold that no Fifth Amendment privilege is now available, then the tax-
payer's rights have been effectively decreased by his transfer. In a sense, the
taxpayer is better off without an attorney to study the records than with him.
Indeed, we make it almost appear as though the taxpayer must now closet him-
self with his myriad tax data drawn up around him and permit the attorney
to study or possess the records only when the taxpayer is in a position to grab
them physically, lest some furtive and surreptitious agent may [sic] swoop
down with a summons while the attorney is fingering the treasure.
Id. at 451.
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of records, but counsel in other jurisdictions must proceed at their own
risk. Given the lack of substance for the Kasmir-White distinction and
the usual absence of agreement among the courts in taxpayer fraud liti-
gation, it is likely that at least one other circuit will not adhere to these
rulings. But even if there is unanimous judicial consent on this limited
set of facts, Kasmir opens the door to the application of other rules in
slightly different factual settings. The net effect of this uncertainty could
be to inhibit the free exercise of the right to counsel.
A better rule would satisfy the "personal compulsion" test by rec-
ognizing that an attorney's actual possession is also his client's con-
structive possession regardless of the form of the transfer.69 Under this
view
when the client himself would be privileged from production
of the document, . . . as exempt from self-incrimination, the
attorney having possession of the document is not bound to
produce. . . On the other hand, if the client would be
compellable to produce . . . then the attorney is equally
compellable, if the document is in his custody, to produce un-
der the appropriate procedure.70
69. "The attorney and his client are so identical with respect to the function of the
evidence and to the proceedings which call for its production that any distinction is mere
sophistry." United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir. 1963); see United
States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 765 (5th Cir. 1973), affd en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (Ains-
worth, J., dissenting).
The suggestion made here that an attorney's actual possession ought to be consid-
ered his client's constructive possession regardless of the client's participation in the
transfer of possession to the attorney does not overlook the traditional property require-
ments for possession. While it can be argued that possession by an attorney gives his
client some degree of physical control over the documents, it would admittedly be quite
difficult to manufacture an intent to control by the client where he did not even have
knowledge of his attorney's possession. Nevertheless, the dual test of possession can be
interpreted flexibly by the courts here, as it has been elsewhere, to avoid defeating an
important purpose or policy when a finding of possession or no possession is crucial.
(E.g., possession of property is also possession of its contents; PERKms, CRimNAL LAW
257-258 (2d ed. 1969): "an employee who obtains property from his employer has cus-
tody only, but an employee who obtains property from a third person for his employer
has possession of the property;" Id. at 240-43.)
In the area of criminal law, the usual scienter requirements coupled with the canon
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed favor a finding of no possession if the
statute allegedly violated requires possession for conviction. Conversely, the self-incrim-
ination provision is raised as a defense in a criminal proceeding and "must be accorded
liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
In this circumstance a court should not rigidly apply the test for possession and thereby
undermine an important constitutional objective.
70. WiGMona § 2307, at 592 (emphasis in the original). In certain circumstances
documents are not eligible for fifth amendment protection even though the client has
possession of them. These include situations where the privilege has been waived (Zieg-
ler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439, 446-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949);
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In addition, where the party in possession is an attorney, the tax-
payer's "legitimate expectation of privacy" should provide an alterna-
tive ground for ruling in his favor. When the taxpayer is not in actual
possession, the resolution of this issue depends on the normal functions
of the possessor 71 and not on any non-possessory interest the taxpayer
might have in the documents .7  And it should not be made to turn
on the taxpayer's knowledge of, or participation in, the transfer of pos-
session.73  Therefore, given the promise of confidentiality implicit in
the attorney-client relationship,7 4 any documents which are eligible for
fifth amendment protection, when used or possessed by an attorney on
his client's behalf, should give rise to a "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy."75
MCCORMICK § 132, at 278-79); cases involving the documents of incorporated and unin-
corporated associations (see note 89 and accompanying text); and applications of the
"required documents exception" (United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368-69
(M.D. Ga. 1955)).
71. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
72. The Couch majority made no reference to ownership in its discussion of this
issue notwithstanding that the taxpayer in that case was the owner of the documents
in question. Id. But the Court's express rejection of ownership as a criterion for apply-
ing the fifth amendment when it discussed the personal compulsion question was un-
equivocal, see text accompanying note 17 supra.
73. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
74. In analyzing this issue the Kasmir court stressed the unique nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship. It distinguished Couch, which had involved an accountant-client
relationship, on the grounds that an independent accountant has a legal duty to disclose
whereas an attorney has a ". . strict, ethical obligation to prevent disclosure ....
broader than and independent of the attorney-client privilege . . . ." 499 F.2d at 453
(citation omitted). Kasmir acknowledged that the attorney-client relationship, as distin-
guished from the attorney-client privilege (which was "admittedly not available here"),
could not, in itself, justify the refusal to turn over the documents. But the attorney-
client relationship could form a reasonable basis for a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
regarding documents in an attorney's possession, and thus support a claim for fifth
amendment protection. Id. (The attorney-client privilege was not available because of
the pre-existing documents rule. See MCCORMICK § 89, at 185; WiGMoRE § 2307, at
591. Note: Some courts have held that documents produced by an accountant for the
purpose of assisting an attorney in advising or defending a taxpayer are within the attor-
ney-client privilege. United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). But this is not true where the documents were
prepared under the direction of the taxpayer and before the attorney entered the case.
United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972); Bouschor v. United States, 316
F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963). See generally Annot., 15 A.L.R. FED. 771, 793-98 (1973).
An alternative formulation has been suggested which would avoid the constitutional is-
sues in a self-incrimination claim by allowing the attorney-client privilege to cover docu-
ments in an attorney's possession which would be protected by the fifth amendment if
held by the client. Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 YALE L.J. 539
(1965). See note 78 infra. This position was cited with approval in United States V.
Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 345 (M.D. Pa. 1973)).
75. There are situations where documents are not eligible for fifth amendment pro-
tection regardless of who possesses them; see note 70 supra.
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THE ATTORNEY'S STANDING TO ASSERT THE CLIENT-TAXPAYER'S FIFTH
AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE ON HIS CLIENT'S BEHALF
Having resolved the issue of availability of the privilege in the tax-
payer's favor, the question remains whether the attorney may assert this
claim on his client's behalf where the taxpayer is not a party to the ac-
tion.7' The disposition of this issue posed little difficulty for the Kas-
mir court which is remarkable in light of the lack of consensus among
the courts in this area. On the basis of "reason" and one line of au-
thority, Kasmir held that the attorney had standing. 7
The alternative view, by no means in disfavor,75 derives from the
language of two early Supreme Court decisions, neither of which in-
volved the issue in point. Hale v. Henkel7 9 dealt with a case where
an agent of a corporation sought to plead the fifth amendment as a bar
to his testimony concerning his principal. The Court denied this plea,
stating that the privilege is a purely personal one and cannot be raised
to avoid incriminating some third person even though the witness is the
agent of that person.80
76. For the taxpayer's right to intervene in the proceeding under FED. R. CIV. P.
24(a) (2), see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
77. 499 F.2d at 454. The following authorities have stated that an attorney has
standing to raise the taxpayer's self-incrimination privilege on the taxpayer's behalf:
United States v. Kasmir, 499, F.2d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Judson,
322 F.2d 460, 463-65 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d
Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Brody v. United States, 243
F.2d 378, 387 n.5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1956); MCoRMICK § 120, at 254; WiGMoRE §
2270, at 416; see Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 80 (1913); WIGMoRE § 2307,
At 592. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973),
a!f'd en banc, 487 F.2d 1335, "assumed without deciding" that the attorney had standing
and then proceeded to dispose of the case on other grounds. Id. at 762.
78. The following authorities have indicated that an attorney lacks standing:
United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964);
Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Judson, 322
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (Foley, J., dissenting); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1961); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1956); Remmer v. United
States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953), vacated on other grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954),
re-aff'd, 222 F.2d 720 (1955), vacated on other grounds, 350 U.S. 377 (1956); Ziegler
v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949); London
v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 1910); In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S.
TAx CAS. % 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962); In re Blumenberg, 191 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., 19
F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1956); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga.
1955). Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 74 YALE L.J 539 (1965) agrees
with this position, but would mitigate its harshness by abrogating the pre-existing docu-
ments rule in certain cases thereby allowing a claim to attorney-client privilege in place
of a self-incrimination claim. See note 74 supra.
79. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
80. Id. at 69-70.
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By way of dictum, it was added that "so strict is the rule that the
privilege is a personal one that it has been held in some cases that coun-
sel will not be allowed to make the objection.81
Two observations are noteworthy. First, the Court in Hale was
concerned with the enforcement of the Sherman Act, and other simi-
lar federal legislation and what mischief might result if combinations
or conspiracies could gain protection by an extension of the fifth amend-
ment in the agency context.8 2  The individual taxpayer and his at-
torney could hardly be said to pose such a threat. Second, the above
language of the Court admits that to refuse counsel standing is not the
universal rule.
In United States v. White,ss a union president was arraigned on
contempt charges for failure to obey a subpoena commanding him to
produce union records. In refusing to grant fifth amendment protec-
tion, the Court emphasized the personal nature of the privilege and the
fact that it could not be used in a "representative capacity."8 4
Some courts have seized upon this language and, giving it entirely
literal interpretation, have denied an attorney's standing. Since an at-
torney is an agent for his client and since all agents act in a "repre-
sentative capacity," an attorney lacks standing to claim the privilege on
his client's behalf.55 Other courts, while not doing so expressly, appear
to be applying the same analysis.8 6
While this logic might be criticized as being unimaginative, it is
also incorrect because it overlooks the meaning White attached to the
word "representative."' 7 The Court echoed the concerns of Hale in
extending protection to non-natural individuals whose economic activi-
81. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
84. Id. at 699. The language used by the court appears in the text corresponding
to note 27 supra.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D.NJ.), appeal dis-
missed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
86. See, e.g., Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1963).
87. The White court said, "[t]he test . . . is whether . . . a particular type of or-
ganization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities
that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of
its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests only. If so, the
privilege cannot be invoked .. . ." 322 U.S. at 701. This implies that a "personal ca-
pacity" involves cases of natural individuals and a "representative capacity" concerns
representatives of non-privileged organizations (i.e., those that may not claim the self-
incrimination privilege directly). United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.
1963); 19 ViLL. L. Rnv. 186, 188 n.15 (1973); See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 358 F. Supp. 661, 665-67 (D. Md. 1973); WiGomRE § 2259a.
[Vol. 10: 646
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ties have such a broad scope by allowing their agents to claim the priv-
ilege.88 Reading Hale and White together, neither incorporated nor
unincorporated organizations can receive fifth amendment protection
through their agents. 89 This says nothing about the situation of the at-
torney and his individual client.
Many of the decisions which have said that an attorney lacked
standing stated it in dictum," and in others that issue became con-
fused with an alternative ground for disposition of the case.91 The
number of cases in which the resolution of the standing issue was the
sole ground for ruling against the taxpayer are quite few.92 Although
these considerations might seem to weaken the argument that an attor-
ney lacks standing, in those cases where the lack has been asserted,
by dictum or otherwise, the courts have done so with unmistakable
clarity.93
The chief concern of these holdings has been the frustration and
obstruction of justice by allowing some "third person' to plead the priv-
ilege of another. 94 But this reasoning neglects the fundamentally
unique nature of the attorney-client relationship. In a sense the attor-
ney is not a "third person" but is, for all intents and purposes, the tax-
payer himself.95 By denying an attorney standing,
the government could thus put any taxpayer to the choice of
attending hearings or investigations, sometimes carried on
over considerable periods of time, or waiving his privilege
against self-incrimination. Such a rule would accomplish
nothing except to impose a heavy penalty in terms of time
88. 322 U.S. at 700.
89. And, of course, they may not claim it directly. Id. at 698, 700-01.
90. See Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 285 (9th Cir. 1953), vacated on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), re-affirmed, 222 F.2d 720 (1955), vacated on other
grounds, 350 U.S. 377 (1956); Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439, 447 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949); In re Blumenberg, 191 F. Supp. 904-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334, 340-
41 (E.D. Wis. 1956); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
91. See In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 866, 868-69 (8th Cir. 1956); London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179
F. 506, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 888-90
(D.NJ.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
92. See United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 976 (1964); Bousehor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1963); In
Re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. TAx CAs. 1[ 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
93. See, e.g., Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1949). "[Alppel-
lant's privilege was personal to him and could not be claimed by someone else for him,
not even by his counsel." Id. at 447.
94. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 469 (9th Cir. 1963) (Foley, J., dissent-
ing).
95. Note 69 supra.
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and money on those taxpayers who chose to assert their right
against self-incrimination .... 91
CONCLUSIONS
According to the newly announced Supreme Court criteria "gov-
ernmental compulsion against the person of the accused" and the ac-
cused's "legitimate expectation of privacy" will control the availability
of the taxpayer's self-incrimination privilege with respect to documents
sought be the government in tax fraud investigations.
Applying this test in two recent decisions, the Fifth Circuit has ar-
rived at inconsistent results. Despite indications in those cases to the
contrary, either aspect of the test should be sufficient to support a tax-
payer's claim to fifth amendment protection when the documents are
eligible for this protection and are in an attorney's possession, regard-
less of how the transfer of possession took place.
Possession, and not ownership, of documents subjects an individ-
ual to the compulsions abhorred by fifth amendment. When the tax-
payer is not in actual or constructive possession, the normal functions
of the party who has possession determine the taxpayer's "legitimate
expectation of privacy" with regard to documents.
There is widespread disagreement on the issue of an attorney's
standing to assert his client's fifth amendment protection on the client's
behalf. The view which refuses standing lacks merit because it relies
exclusively on the broad dictum of two early Supreme Court decisions.
Hence, given the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship and
the unnecessary hardships to the taxpayer attending a contrary result,
the attorney should be permitted to plead the self-incrimination privi-
lege for his client.
96. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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